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COMMENTS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW-UNITED NATIONS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRI-
BUNALS AS ADJUDICATORS OF DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF EMPLOY-
MENT CONTRACTS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS-A crucial 
though relatively unpublicized problem arising from the creation 
of international organizations is that of establishing and maintain-
ing the staff or secretariat needed to perform the administrative 
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£unctions of these organizations. Such a staff must possess not only 
the competence and integrity of a national civil service, but also 
an international loyalty or outlook which includes " ... an aware-
ness . . . of the needs, emotions, and prejudices of the peoples of 
differently-circumstanced countries ... [ and] a capacity for weigh-
ing these frequently imponderable elements in a judicial manner· 
before reaching any decision to which they are relevant."1 
If such an outlook is to be achieved, the members of an inter-
national secretariat must be guaranteed a degree of independence 
from the international organization's member states, from which, 
of necessity, they are recruited. Security of tenure is essential, ex-
cept possibly in the case of the highest officials, in order to insure 
this needed independence from national pressures.2 At the same 
time, providing security of tenure to its staff presents unique prob-
lems to international organizations. 
International organizations have no tradition of civil service 
security that exists in many national states. Furthermore, the di-
rector of an international secretariat has iess contact with a politi-
cally responsible organ than does the head of many national civil 
services, even though he usually possesses wider discretionary power 
over his staff. And while the United Nations, like the League of 
Nations, has resorted to individual employment contracts in an at-
tempt to guarantee the requisite security, initially no remedy was 
available on these contracts because the paramount need of an in-
ternational organization for freedom from undue national pres-
sures generally necessitates its immunity from suit in national 
courts.3 In addition, it has been felt that employment disputes 
are not of sufficient importance to warrant the jurisdiction of the 
International Court- of Justice. 4 
I. League Attempts to Solve the Problem 
The League of Nations first attempted to supply a contract 
remedy by granting an aggrieved staff member the right of appeal 
1 Jenks, "Some Problems of an International Civil Service," 3 Pun. AD. REv. 93 at 95 
(1943). 
2Also required are privileges and immunities similar to traditional diplomatic privi-
leges and immunities, the degree of which may vary with the level of the official involved. 
See Cohen, "The United States and the United Nations Secretariat: A Preliminary Ap-
praisal," I McGILL L.J. 169 at 171 (1953). . 
3 Article 105 of the United Nations Charter provides: "The Organizatio~ shall enjoy 
in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary 
for the fulfillment of its purposes,'' and a specific immunity provision is inserted in each 
U.N. employment contract. 
4L. of N. Doc., Records of the 2nd Assembly, Meetings of the Committees II 71-72 
(1921). 
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to the Council of the League.I; Upon the exercise of this right, 
however, the Council, recognizing the shortcomings of having an 
organ of one party to the contract act as judge, submitted the dis-
pute to an ,ad hoc committee of jurists appointed by it, declaring 
in advance that it would adopt the conclusions of the committee 
as its own.6 
Feeling, perhaps for practical administrative reasons, that ad 
hoc bodies were not the solution, the League finally established a 
permanent administrative tribunal7 as an "exclusively judicial body 
set up to determine the legal rights of officials on strictly legal 
grounds."8 This administrative tribunal continues today under 
the International Labor Organization. 
IL The Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations 
Using the League's experience as its guide, the United Nations 
General Assembly, in 1949, established a similar administrative 
tribunal.9 In 1953 this tribunal declared illegal the Secretary-
General's dismissal of United States nationals for invoking the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution before a fed-
eral grand jury or a Senate investigating committee or, in some 
cases, both.10 This decision gave rise to a request from the Gen-
eral Assembly to the International Court of Justice for an advisory 
opinion on the questi~n: 
"Having regard to the Statute of the United Nations Ad-
ministrative Tribunal and to any other relevant instruments 
and to the relevant records, has the General Assembly the 
right on any grounds to refuse to give effect to an award of 
compensation made by that Tribunal in favour of a staff mem-
ber of the United Nations whose contract of service has been 
terminated without his assent?"11 
5 L. of N. Doc., Records of the 1st Assembly, Plenary Meetings 663-664 (1920). 
6 L. of N., O.J., 6th year, No. 7, Minutes of the 34th sess. of the Council 858 (1925). 
7 L. of N., O.J., SPEC. SUPP. No. 54, Records of the 8th Assembly, Plenary Meetings 
201, 478 (1927). 
SL. of N., O.J., SPEC. SUPP. No. 58, Records of the 8th Assembly, Meetings of Com-
mittees, Minutes of the 4th Committee 251 (1927). 
9U.N. Gen. Assembly Off. Rec., 4th sess., Annex, Agenda Item No. 44 at 170 (Doc. 
No. II42) (1949). Under article 2 of the statute the tribunal is given jurisdiction over all 
contract disputes, including the interpretation of relevant rules and regulations. It is 
not given jurisdiction to review disciplinary action of the Secretary-General, unless, of 
course, such action constitutes a contract dispute. 
10 Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal, U.N. Docs. AT/DEC/18 to AT/DEC/38 
(1953). [While the texts of tribunal decisions are not published, they are available at 
United Nations headquarters for inspection.] 
11 U.N. Gen. Assembly Off. Rec., 8th sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 38, at 16 (Doc. 
A/2534) (1953). 
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Answering this question in the negative, the court concl~ded 
from an examination of the statute of the tribunal12 that it " ... is 
established . . . as an independent and truly judicial body pro-
nouncing final judgments without appeal within the limited field 
of its functions."13 
While assuming that the question submitted had reference 
only to decisions by a properly constituted tribunal acting within 
its statutory competence, the court added: 
"In order that the judgments pronounced by such a judi-
cial tribunal could be subjected to review by any body other 
than the tribunal itself, it would be necessary . . . that the 
statute of that tribunal or some other legal instrument govern-
ing it should contain an express provision to that effect.''14 
In any event, the court expressed doubt as to the ability of the 
General Assembly to exercise the function of judicial review. 
III. The Law Applicable by the United Nations Tribunal 
Granting the premise that the United Nations tribunal is a 
truly judicial body, the question arises as to what law it should 
apply. There is, of course, no international law of contract, in-
ternational contracts generally being subject to the municipal law 
where made or primarily to be performed.15 Under article 104 of 
its charter, the United Nations enjoys "in the territory of each of 
its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the ex-
ercise of its functions and th_e fulfillment of its purposes." There-
fore, in principle at least, its employment contracts might appear 
12 Especially: Art. 2: "The ·Tribunal shall be competent to hear and pass judgment 
upon applications alleging non-observance of contracts of employment. . . ." 
Art. 3: "No member of the Tribunal can be dismissed by the General Assembly unless 
the other members are of the unanimous opinion that he is unsuited for further service." 
Art. 10: "The judgments shall be final and without appeal." U.N. Gen. Assembly 
Off. Rec., 4th sess., Annex, Agenda Item No. 44, at 170 (Doc. No. 1142) (1949). 
13 Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. REP. 47 at 53. See Honig, "Effect of Awards of the U.N. Adminis-
trative Tribunal,'' 104 L.J. 534 (1954). 
141954 I.C.J. REP. 47 at 56. It is also interesting to consider article XII of the amended 
statute of the administrative tribunal of the International Labor Organization. "In any 
case in which the Governing Body of the International Labour Office .•• challenges a 
decision of the Tribunal confirming its jurisdiction or considers that a decision of the 
Tribunal is vitiated by a fundamental fault in the procedure followed, the question of 
the validity of the decision given by the Tribunal shall be submitted, ... for an advisory 
opinion, to the International Court of Justice." Records of Proceedings of the 29th sess. 
of the Int. Labour Conference 229 (1946), cited in Memorandum by the International 
Labour Office, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, I.C.J. Adv. Op. of July 13, 1954, 
73 (1954). 
15 See KELsEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 313 (1950). 
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to fall under this general rule.16 Assuming its theoretical validity, 
however, such a proposition is of little practical value, since the 
only remedy available on these contracts is recourse to the ad-
ministrative tribunal, which has not been directed to apply the 
municipal law of any particular state. 
The administrative tribunal is directed to apply the terms of 
the contracts and the staff regulations and rules incorporated in 
them.17 While the staff regulations do not spell out a detailed 
code of contract law, the tribunal, dealing as it does with a partic-
ular kind of contract, would not appear in need of such a code. 
To the extent that it may require principles of law other than 
those laid down by the staff regulations, it would seem in order 
for it to adopt as a matter of first impression those it deems most 
appropriate. And the principles clearly most appropriate are 
those intended by the parties to be applicable. If necessary, this 
intent of the parties may be implied from the terms of their contract 
and the nature of their relationship. For example, from the very 
fact that a contract has been made, it may be assumed or implied 
that the parties intended to be governed by the most fundamental 
and universal rules of municipal contract law, e. g., neither party 
may alter the terms of the contract without the consent of the 
other. 
But reference to any but the most universal and fundamental 
principles of municipal contract law would not seem to be in 
order, unless clearly indicated by the parties. This is especially 
16 Brandon suggests a contrary view, saying: " .•• some transactions taking place 
within the premises of diplomatic mission may, having regard to their nature, be con• 
sidered as governed by . • . the law of the state sending the mission. . . . This will be 
so with respect to such transactions as contracts made between the Organizations and 
their staff . . . concerning which it may be presumed local law was not intended to 
apply." Brandon, "The Legal Status of the Premises of the United Nations," 28 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT. L. 90 at 98 (1952). The Headquarters Agreement between the United States 
and the United Nations provides in article 3, §7, that "Except as othenvise provided in 
this agreement or in the General Convention, the federal, state and local law of the 
United States shall apply within the headquarters district." It is provided in §8 that 
the U.N. is granted " ... the power to make regulations, operative within the head-
quarters district, for the purpose of establishing therein conditions in all respects neces-
sary for the full execution of its functions." And "no federal, state or local law or 
regulation of the United States which is inconsistent with a regulation of the United 
Nations authorized by this section shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be applicable 
within the headquarters district." 11 U.N. TREATY SER. 18 (1947). 
17 In the few cases thus far coming before it, the tribunal has apparently found these 
sources of law sufficient. For a discussion of the interpretation and application of staff 
regulations in the Fifth Amendment cases [U.N. docs. AT/DEC/IS to AT/DEC/38 
(1953)], see Cohen, "The United Nations Secretariat-Some Constitutional and Adminis-
trative Development," 49 A111. J. INT. L. 295 at 306-309 (1955). 
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true of attempts sometimes made18 to apply, by analogy, the prin-
ciple of municipal public law that a public administration always 
retains the right to abridge the contract rights of its staff if the 
public interest so demands, as long as this right is not exercised 
arbitrarily. Any application of such a principle to United Nations 
employment contracts is clearly both unwarranted and unneces-
sary. By subjecting their contracts to the staff regulations as they 
may be amended by the General Assembly,19 and by giving the 
Secretary-General the right to award compensation in lieu of 
specific performance,20 the parties to these contracts have expressly 
defined the means by which the United Nations, admittedly analo-
gous to a public organization, may protect the "public interest." 
By so doing they evidence an intent that these means be exclusive. 
Furthermore, in regard to international organizations gen-
erally, the attempt to apply municipal public law concepts over-
looks several significant legal distinctions between employment 
with such organizations and with a national state. A national 
state which contracts with an individual is not only a party to the 
contract but also possesses the overriding sovereign power to legis-
late iii the public interest. The United Nations General Assembly 
and other international organs presently in existence have no gen-
-eral legislative power but only the specific powers granted them by 
their charters. An individual contracting with an international 
organization does so not as a subject of that organization but as an 
equal, and therefore any rights and duties either party has toward 
18 See, e.g., Written Statements of the U.S.A., Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, 
I.C.J. Adv. Op. of July 13, 1954, 131 at 177 (1954). 
19 The significance of this provision is seen by the fact that while the General As-
sembly may not set aside an award made by the tribunal, if the recent opinion of the 
I.C.J. is followed, it could amend the staff regulations so as to provide that use of the 
Fifth Amendment, even prior to the amendments of the regulations, would be a proper 
ground for dismissal by the Secretary-General. Following the Fifth Amendment cases 
(note 17 supra), the Eighth General Assembly did in fact amend the staff regulations 
and rules so as to limit permissible political activities of staff members and to give the 
Secretary-General broader grounds upon which to dismiss. U.N. Gen. Assembly Off. Rec., 
8th sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 51, at 45-46 (Doc. A/Resolution/191) (1953). For a dis-
cussion of these amendments, see Cohen, "The United Nations Secretariat-Some Con-
stitutional and Administrative Developments," 49 AM. J. INT. L. 295 at 309-312 (1955). 
20 Article 9 of the tribunal's statute provides: "If the Tribunal finds that the appli-
cation is well founded, it shall order the rescinding of the decision contested or the 
specific performance of the obligation invoked. At the same time the Tribunal shall fix 
the amount of compensation to be paid to the applicant for the injury sustained should 
the Secretary-General, within thirty days of the notification of the judgment, decide, in 
the interest of the United Nations, that the applicant shall be compensated without further 
action being taken in the case ..•. " U.N. Gen. Assembly Off. Rec., 8th sess., Annexes, 
Agenda Item 51, at 46 (Doc. A/Resolution/191) (1953). 
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the other must stem from their contract.21 Thus, even in the case 
of the League, where employment contracts entered into prior to 
1932 were not expressly subjected to a right of its Council to 
amend staff regulations, attempts to apply the concept of a unilat-
eral right to abridge were unsuccessful in most instances.22 
V. Conclusion 
Professor Cohen has expressed the view that, in light of the cold 
war, "it is remarkable ... that an international ... organization, 
embracing both 'East' and 'West' should . . . be carrying on its 
political and welfare activities with considerable vigor."23 This 
being true, it would seem not unwarranted to conclude that ad-
ministrative tribunals of the nature of the United Nations tribunal 
are proving a solution to the problem faced by international or-
ganizations of insuring security of tenure to their staffs. There-
fore, as the number of international organizations increase and 
their functions expand, it may be expected that the significance 
of these administrative tribunals will increase correspondingly. 
Today, in addition to the United Nations and International Labor 
Organization, organizations accepting the jurisdiction of one of the 
tribunals of these two organizations include the World Health 
Organization, the I11ternational Telecommunication Union, the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organiza-
tion, and various other United Nations agencies. While hereto-
fore the number of cases coming before these tribunals has been 
too small to give rise to a recognizable system of jurisprudence,24 
such a system should become discernible as the number of cases 
inevitably increases. 
Edward W. Powers, S.Ed. 
21 Here, as in international law generally, the distinction between rights and powers 
must always be kept in mind. The power to enforce rights against a state, and here 
against an international organization, depends, in effect, upon the consent of the state 
or international organization. 
22 See, e.g.: Report of the Committee of Jurists in 1932, L. OF N., O.J., SPEC. SUPP. 
No. 107, Records of the 13th Assembly, Meetings of the Committees, Minutes of the 4th 
Committee 206-208 (1932); Report of the Committtee of Thirteen, L. OF N., 0. J., 
SPEC. SUPP. No. 88, Records of the 11th Assembly, Minutes of the 4th Committee 
290 (1930); Thirteen decisions of the League tribunal of February 26, 1946, re-
ferred to in L. OF N., O.J., SPEC. SUPP. No. 194, Records of the 20th (Conclusion) and 
21st Sessions of the Assembly 261-263 (1946). 
23 Cohen, "The United Nations Secretariat-Some Constitutional and Administrative 
Developments," 49 AM. J. INT. L. 295 at 319 (1955). 
24 Prior to 1946, the League tribunal gave judgments in only 21 cases and affirmative 
relief in only eight of these. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TR.IBUNALS, PAST AND FUTURE 221 
(1944) (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Series). 
